

History as Bridge?:
Understanding Political Dynamics in rural Africa.

Abdul Raufu Mustapha.

1. Introduction:

Since the late 1980s, Africa has undergone tremendous change in its political dynamics. Democratization is one of the defining characteristics of contemporary Africa and in this presentation I am interested in examining how we understand democratization and its implications for public authority at the rural level.

Is there any process of democratization going on in rural Kano? What is the best methodological approach for addressing such a question?

I identify three dominant ways in which democratization has been approached in current literature on Africa:

Quantitative approach from some strands of the political science discipline;

Culturalist approach borrowing from socio-anthropology;

Historical Institutional approach.

My objective is to show in what ways each of these three approaches can contribute to our understanding of the political dynamics of rural Kano; and what are their limitations.

Two sets of methodological critiques will be attempted:

How useful have these methodologies been in explaining the national democratization process?

How effective are the methodologies in the local context of rural Kano?

Is there a problem of scale and level of generalization which curtail the applicability of some methodologies to local contexts?

In section two, I summarize what some Quantitative and Culturalist approaches have to say about Nigerian democratization.

Though both raise important questions about Nigerian democratization, their claims to methodological superiority falls apart when criticisms are raised at both the national and local levels of analyses.

The reasons for this limitation are explored.

In section three, I summarize my understanding of the political dynamics of rural Kano, relying largely on historical institutionalism, but also borrowing from the quantitative and culturalist perspectives.

In the concluding section, I argue that while history, institutional logics, quantitative methods, and an understanding of the culture of politics are key to understanding the modern politics of Africa, these are not a substitute for judgment and sensitivity.

2. Numbers, Culture & Political Processes:

Numbers:

The quantitative method has gradually moved from being one amongst many methods, to being the preferred method in some analyses of African politics.

Commenting on the discipline of Political Science in the US, King et al argue that:

‘in the last decade or two, we have imported and adapted statistical approaches from other disciplines, created new models from scratch, and applied these models in every empirical subfield. ... Most impressively, about half of all articles in political science journals now include some form of statistical analysis, and the methods are becoming increasingly sophisticated....’

This quantitative bent can also be seen in the increasing centrality of opinion polls in the American political process since the late 1940s and in statistically driven debates about race and politics in the so-called ‘Bradley Effect’ and the ‘Bradley-Effect Effect’.

This statistical orientation has also permeated the field of public policy analyses: (cf. Mannes 2008).

There has been a tendency to ‘export’ this quantitative approach to other parts of the world from the 1960s – including to Africa. (cf Heath et al 2005)

I wish to draw attention to two specific sources with a direct bearing on Nigerian politics.

Country-level data collected by Freedom House;

Continent-level analyses of electoral data by Staffan Lindsberg.

Freedom House has been collecting statistical data for Political Rights and Civil Liberties for Nigeria since 1989.

The trend from 1989 to 2007 is shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Freedom House Indicators for Nigeria
Political Rights

Civil Liberties

Mean

1989-95

Mean

1996-2000

Mean

2001-06

2007

Mean

1989-95

Mean

1996-2000

Mean

2001-06

2007

5.83

6.20

4.00
4
4.83
5.20
4.33
4

Source: Freedom House. All values on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 representing the lowest.

These numbers suggest that Nigerians have, over the period in question, enjoyed greater political rights and civil liberties, with the exception of the late Abacha period. This is a positive take on Nigerian democratization, suggesting that despite the hiccups, Nigerian's faltering democracy is being gradually institutionalized.

The second source of quantitative analysis is Staffan Lindberg's work on the connection between democracy and elections.

Lindberg argues that the inception of multiparty elections and the repetition of elections 'instigate liberalization' measured in terms of increases in political participation, competition, and legitimacy (2006: xi-xii).

He suggests that generalisations from continent-wide data on elections 'convey a measured optimism' about African democratisation (2006: 143).

The general tone of his argument is that a statistical method focusing on a sub-field has the potential to unlock trends which more actor-oriented and anecdotal qualitative methods are unable to discern.

The general trend is the increased democratization in Africa with every subsequent election. By the logic of this argument, Nigeria which has held three national elections since 1998 and had a civilian-to-civilian transition for the first time in its history must be improving the quality of its democratization process.

Are these two quantitatively derived views consistent with our understanding of the quality of democratization in rural Kano?

Ideally, quantitative and qualitative approaches should complement each other.

Quantitative approaches give us aggregative patterns that would not otherwise be immediately obvious, helping us to generalize the phenomenon under study.

Qualitative approaches, on the other hand, are more appropriate for dealing with process issues, and addressing the 'how' and 'why' of societal patterns.

However, the problem with the increasing tendency towards quantification in the study of African politics is the implicit downgrading of other approaches.

Actor oriented theories are looked down upon as being too heavily reliant on 'anecdotes'.

In the African context, this drift towards the quantitative approach raises three problems:

- (1) the implied theory of knowledge;
- (2) the utility of the tools used;
- (3) the relevance of the approach to national and local African realities.

Theory of Knowledge: The quantitative approach is based on a hypothetico-deductive theory of knowledge which proceeds by stages:

From our knowledge of particular cases, we formulate general hypotheses;

From the hypothesis we deduce the consequences which are logically implied;

We identify the evidence by which the claims of the hypothesis can then be tested.

The problem is that both the hypothesis and the data are constructed abstractions, seeking to explain aspects of a more complex reality.

Quite often, data is presented, not as a partial representation of reality, but as the reality.

We construct theories while data is reality 'out there', outside of ourselves.

But there is nothing intrinsically 'hard' about numbers; some demographic and electoral data from across the world are quite 'soft'.

In the search for predictive certitude, data is invariably shorn of its complexity, context, and is thereby rarified.

Laurence Whitehead is right when he warned that in the study of African democratization, we must guard against 'unicausal and predictive models favoured by a dominant school of social science technicians' and that we must avoid the 'heavy-handed certainties' which such studies give rise to.

Inappropriate Communicative Tools: The second problem pertains to the tools dominantly used in quantitative approaches.

King et al (2000) make a plea for improved 'candor and realism' in the statistical discourse about politics.

They add that: 'Unfortunately, our success at developing and implementing new quantitative methods has come at some cost in communication. Many quantitative articles contain impenetrable statistical jargon and unfamiliar mathematical expressions that confuse readers and seem to obscure more of social reality than they reveal.'

It would seem that our quest for increased certitude comes with some dose of obfuscation.

Relevance to African conditions: The third problem with the excessive reliance on the quantitative approach in African politics is the lack of robust infrastructure for data collection on a regular and reliable basis, the consequent dearth of reliable data, and the overall shallowness of the numerical reach of governments, social actors and academics.

Harry Blair's 1975 study of village level politics in India gives an idea of what can be achieved through statistical analyses in rural politics.

He correlates constituency level data from three electoral cycles with demographic data to predict the determinants of voting behaviour.

Such a study is impossible in much of rural Africa as we have neither the consistent and reliable electoral data, nor do we have reliable data on primary characteristics (ethnicity, gender, religion, etc) and secondary attributes (literacy, occupation, etc).

Our statistical reach has not gone beyond disaggregating rural and urban responses to national level surveys.

Some intriguing questions have been raised by some of such surveys. For example, while Lewis and Bratton

suggest that rural Nigerians have less access to information about democracy compared to their urban cousins, Kuenzi and Lambright

, on the other hand, suggest that rural Africans, including Nigerians, are more likely to vote, compared to urban dwellers.

How does less information on democracy translate into more electoral participation in rural Nigeria?

On the basis of available survey evidence, we can only speculate as Kuenzi and Lambright do. I am personally aware of only one micro-level statistical study of politics in an African setting – and that was urban based.

For these three reasons, we can understand the implicit pitfalls of a heavily quantitative approach to the study of African politics.

While it is possible to get some national level data from elections and surveys, there is an almost total absence of relevant data below the national level.

Under current conditions, rural Kano politics would be almost impenetrable using a purely quantitative approach.

Culture:

‘Culturalist’ scholars, for their part, concentrate on embedded values, rather than on numbers. Representative of this school, Chabal and Daloz, are adamant about the ‘unreliability of statistical evidence’ and the ‘untrustworthiness of questionnaires, opinion polls and surveys’ in the African context (2006: 14).

In their view, ‘the key to making sense of ... politics lies in an analysis of the cultural context within which ... power is exercised’ (2006: 14-15).

‘... a cultural approach makes it possible to understand the extent to which the exercise of power, south of the Sahara, is predicated on a personalized concept of politics. This explains ... why relations of legitimacy, representation and accountability are primarily vertical, between patrons and clients.’ (2006 29).

Pervasive patron-clientage, patrimonialism, and the unchallenged power of the ‘Big Man’ are central to this understanding of the political process.

Coming specifically to Nigeria, this culturalist view suggests that the cultural logic of Nigeria renders the notion of a Nigerian state meaningless because of its lack of institutionalisation.

One cannot talk of democratization in such a context because the culturalist approach:

...reveals why present transitions are unable to change the nature of politics in Africa. The holding of regular multiparty elections ... has come about largely because of outside pressure ... it is democracy that has been adapted to the logic ... of clientelism and not, as so often proclaimed, the reverse’ (2006 29)

The logic of this position is that there is no democratization in Nigeria – either at the national or local levels.

If any thing, the culturalists may draw our attention to what they see as the untenability of democracy in a climate of religious intolerance and hysterical mobilization: ‘When the government of Kano State celebrated the proclamation of a new Islamic penal code, more than a million people gathered.’

The culturalist approach is likely to dismiss the encounter with democracy in rural Kano as a ritualistic charade which leaves the basic patron-client structures of society unchanged.

The culturalist approach rests on the well-founded premise that culture generates a world of meaning which strongly influences notions of rights, obligation, and authority.

Where the approach comes to grief is in the idiosyncratic interpretative lens chosen by some scholars, and the all-too-frequent descent into cultural essentialism (cf Meagher 2006). Furthermore, Erdmann and Engel argue that the depiction of all official relations in Africa as privatized and informal does not reflect reality.

We need an understanding of African politics which includes not just the personal and capricious, but also the systemic and the organizational, with emphasis on system wide structures of control and coordination.

The culturalist approach fails to address these concerns.

3. Rural Kano: A Historical Interpretation

I conclude, therefore, that neither the quantitative nor the culturalist approach, despite their exaggerated claims, can help us make sense of the politics of democratization in rural Kano. Here, I present summaries of arguments about democratization in rural Kano developed elsewhere.

My central thesis is that historical consciousness is key to understanding local political dynamics in rural Kano.

Modern Politics in rural Kano:

4 aspects are crucial to understanding local peasant politics in rural Kano:

- (1) The deep historical lens through which many rural communities interpreted their contemporary realities;
- (2) The rural social structure and its dynamics;
- (3) Networks of personal clientage;
- (4) The power and malleability of religious and communal ideologies

While the historical method is key to understanding the first, the quantitative method is significant for understanding the second, and the cultural approach is central to understanding the third and fourth.

History:

The power of historical consciousness over electoral politics became apparent in rural Kano between 1940 and 1983.

Historical explanations need to interpret people's actions in the light of values to which they are oriented; explanations in history are dependent on the cultural context within which the events unfold.

Scholars like M.G. Smith and Ken Post have pointed out that the most important political and sociological distinction in pre-colonial Hausa society was the division between the:

title-holding aristocrats (masu sarauta)
and commoners (talakawa).

At the point of colonial occupation, this socio-historical division was also apparent. Writing on rural Kano, Lord Lugard pointed out:

‘At first there was considerable lawlessness in the country districts; the Fulani faction [the aristocracy] were driven out, and the people refused to pay any taxes, while the slaves of the Fulani deserted them in large numbers...the peasantry showed a desire to throw off the yoke, and

attacked the tax-collectors, and even attacked Captain Phillips when he went to arrest the perpetrators of one of these outrages...It is probable that it had been caused by a few malcontents, who proposed to obey neither the Fulani nor the British, and whose cry was 'no more taxes, no more slaves, no laws, and each to do as he pleases.'

In rural Kano, Colonial Indirect Rule maintained most of the prerogatives of the aristocracy. As a result, the basic tensions between aristocrats and Commoners persisted throughout the colonial period.

It is this historical animosity which bled into the party political system in the terminal colonial period; the Northern People's Congress (NPC) represented the aristocratic interests while the Northern Elements' Progressive Union (NEPU), represented the commoner worldview.

According to M. G. Smith

: 'peasants enjoyed a political holiday as an indirect and unforeseen consequence of representative government'.

Social Structure:

But colonial Indirect Rule was not only about the sustenance of Emirate political authority through the Native Authorities.

It was also about rapid socio-economic change.

Within rural society, colonialism led to the:

Intensification of peasant cultivation for the world market;

Transformation of slaves into peasants;

Economic differentiation within this expanded peasantry.

While the social status of being a Commoner remained unchanged, the colonial economy was leading to the economic fragmentation of the peasantry into rich, middle, and poor peasants.

In pre-colonial society, rich merchants, though of Commoner status, could be incorporated in subordinate positions within the Emirate system.

Under colonialism, many more rich peasants and merchants emerged within the colonial economy than could be incorporated into the Emirate political and aristocratic structures.

Colonialism created a group of rich peasants and merchants who continued to hold firm to their Commoner identities, invariably in opposition to the aristocratic privileges of the Native Authorities.

It is important to note that from the 1940s, resistance to the aristocracy was strongest in those parts of rural Kano, Zaria, and Katsina with the most developed commercial agricultural.

Though sociologically, rural Kano recognized a social structure characterized by the three layers of rich, middling, and poor peasants,

a quantitative investigation makes it easier to identify these layers as the evidence from rural Kano presented in Table 2 makes clear:

Table 2 Rural Kano Differentiation within the peasantry (Rogo, 1986)

Mean No. of Wives

Mean No. of Children

Mean Acreage

Mean No. of Work Bulls

Mean No. of Cows

% also engaged in wage labouring.

Rich
2.7
14.0
107.0
2.0
6.0
0

Middle
1.3
6.2
6.0
0.7
4.8
25

Poor
1.0
2.5
2.7
0
0
100

Importantly, the colonial economy also led to the emergence of a western-educated salaried class referred to locally as the maaikata who had an ambiguous political relationship with the aristocracy.

Despite colonial efforts to freeze social and political development in northern Nigeria through the policy of Indirect Rule, the colonial economy was to generate social groups that would spearhead a political challenge to the status quo:

Salaried class;
Rich peasants;
Modern artisans.

Networks of Clientage:

While many Commoners identified with the aristocracy on religious or communal grounds, Ken Post showed in his study of the 1959 Federal elections that large swathes of rural Kano, Katsina, and Zaria ignored the seductive appeals of religion, ethnicity, and regionalism and chose instead to vote AGAINST the aristocratic party.

The key to this electoral behaviour lies in the historical consciousness of Commoner oppression.

The Native Authority bureaucracy and patron-client networks with individual aristocrats formed the main connecting links between the NPC and the individual peasants.

Networks of clientage linking some members of the salaried classes, rich peasants, and the modern artisans constituted the institutional linkage between NEPU and the peasantry.

Networks of clientage were key to the operation of rural politics; but these were not the predatory

patron-client relations much beloved by culturalist scholars.

Location in the social hierarchy, rather than cultural disposition, lies at the heart of patron-clientelism in rural Kano.

Historical consciousness and Islam provided the ideological basis of this anti-aristocratic alliance.

The networks were therefore suffused with communal, historical, and religious notions of rights and obligation, far removed from the crass utilitarianism of the culturalist school.

But not everything about the Commoner alliance was about solidarity; apart from addressing their Commoner grievances, Rich peasants also wanted access to the urban and national sphere which the salaried class in NEPU could facilitate.

In return, rich peasants formed the backbone of political mobilization within the peasantry.

Within this broader historical and ideological context rich peasants served as political entrepreneurs and gatekeepers, linking NEPU with the individual peasant and negotiating the interface between rural and national political processes.

This political centrality of the Rich peasantry in rural politics is brought out by the evidence on Table 3:

Table 3 Rural Kano: Party Membership and leadership by Group (%) (Rogo, 1986)

Group

Holds a Leadership Post in local Parties?

Connected to aristocracy?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Rich Peasantry

57

43

28

71

Middle Peasantry

8

92

17

83

Poor Peasantry

10

90

0

100

All

21

79
14
86

Politics in rural Kano therefore centred on opposing tendencies of class and status. Class tendencies thrust the rich peasantry into leadership positions within village politics; but this leadership was articulated and justified, not in class terms, but by recourse to the collective historical consciousness of status deprivation which united all layers of the peasantry. Within this tension between class and status, Collective and Selective incentives were deployed to mobilize peasant support. Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Religion, the bogeymen of national level politics, were marginal to rural Kano politics; NEPU allied itself to the Christian, Igbo dominated National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) at the national level.

Islam:

Conflict over the interpretation of Islam has always been important aspects of the politics of rural Kano.

Instead of the monochromic view on Islam in northern Nigeria - a la Clash of Civilizations - seen in many of the culturalist texts referred to above (see fn 15), Islam was itself the platform for contestation within Hausa society.

Even when doctrines and rituals are the same, conflict over their interpretation reflect the deep social and political divisions in the society.

Crudely speaking, we can talk of two opposed versions of Islam in this period.

The aristocratic forces tended to belong to the Quadiriyya Brotherhood, which is less strict in religious observance, but more conservative in politics.

It emphasized unquestioned obedience to political authority, claiming that disobedience might lead to anarchy, and anarchy might threaten the ability of all to observe necessary religious rituals.

Oppressive rulers would get their comeuppance in the Hereafter and it is not the role of the individual to assume Allah's task of calling such rulers to order.

The only condition under which the subject might disobey the ruler is when the ruler openly embraces unbelief.

The Commoner forces developed a completely different interpretation of Islam.

To start with, they allied themselves to a different Sufi order, the Tijaniyya.

The Tijaniyya are more strict in religious observation but more radical in their politics.

Tijaniyya promoted an egalitarian and libertarian interpretation of the relationship between rulers and followers in an Islamic society.

In their view:

'Islam is the religion of fighters for freedom who pursue justice and righteousness; the religion of those who crave for freedom and independence; the school of resisters of exploitation.'

While the Quadiriyya emphasised *biyayya*, obedience, the Tijaniyya emphasized *mutunci*, or human dignity.

The unitary notion of Islam in the culturalist imagination, often tied to global terrorism, is a

figment of the American imagination.

Democratisation of disempowerment:

What is interesting about democratization in rural Kano is that it brought about less, not more, voice and influence for the peasantry; this is the paradox of democratization.

The radical populist politics in rural Kano started to disintegrate from about 1982, but accelerated after democratization in 1999.

The reasons are sociological, institutional and historical, including:

Military coup in 1966 destroyed both the Native Authority system and the Regional government which formed the institutional backbone of NPC power;

The aristocracy lost its control of prisons and the police;

Many NEPU activists were invited to join the government by Military administrators wanting legitimacy;

Nigeria became a rentier state from 1970 and taxation of the peasantry was no longer critical to state finances; both political and economic trends reduced the pressure on the peasantry.

Furthermore, oil rents encouraged massive state investment in agriculture, creating opportunities for accumulation and differentiation within the peasantry and increasing the value of connections to national level institutions;

New electoral rules now required the possession of a minimum of Secondary School Leaving certificate as a pre-condition for running for office; artisans and peasants who ran on NEPU ticket were now disqualified from the directly contesting for office by military fiat; they were reduced to supporting others, often from the western-educated classes;

Internal conflict within the commoner alliance between a largely western-educated faction which controlled national level resources on the one hand, and a lesser-educated faction which controlled the party on the other.

Unprecedented military authoritarianism from the 1980s and the obliteration of institutional and societal accountability structures;

Elite capture of the political and economic levers of the state;

Heightened levels of ethnic, religious, and communal mobilization and conflict.

By the time the current process of return to democratic rule started in 1998, the political landscape in rural Kano had been transformed beyond recognition.

The rules of the game – set arbitrarily at the national level - favoured the domination of politics by wealthy urban-based individuals, many of whom are retired army Generals.

Politically active peasants increasingly found themselves compelled to operate within networks of personal political clientage with their centres of gravity among the urban rich.

Selective individualized Incentives have virtually replaced the previous admixture of Collective and Selective Incentives.

As a consequence of this incentive structure, there is a fragmentation of rural level political activists into political machines controlled by urban patrons.

Emphasis has shifted from mass politics to machine politics.

Long-standing political allies find themselves sucked into opposing personal machines, giving rise to consternation and disillusionment.

Democratization has led:

first to the fragmentation of rural political activity;
secondly to the subordination of the bits into personalized urban political machines;
and thirdly, to the overall diminished influence of the rural component of the political system.
Rural voters now confront more choice but less control over the political agenda.

This is an example of Claude Ake's 'democratization of disempowerment'.

Democratization has therefore led to a situation in which outside influence over peasant politics has increased as local clientage structures are now unhinged from their moorings in the local moral economy.

One core weakness of the culturalist approach is its incapacity to differentiate between different logics of patron-clientage.

The possibility for the expression of specifically peasant interests has consequently reduced drastically and faced with the buccaneering politics of democratisation, many peasants have turned to the politics of communalism and Islamism.

I should simply add that the connections between Islamic radicalism and democratization in rural Kano are far more complex and complicated than the simplistic narratives of the culturalists on the issue.

The struggle over the definition of rights and obligations under Islam continues to be a prominent feature of rural politics, only that in this new context, the lines of division are less clear and opportunistic tendencies are more pronounced.

Significantly, both 'Shariah' Islam and urban-dominated personal clientelism have not neutered the peasantry in rural Kano as the culturalist approach implies.

Intense conflict over elections at the local level and the increasing resort to intimidation and bribery by the 'Islamist' government bear testimony to a lack of hegemony in the Gramscian sense.

Understanding these conflicts are important, not only for our understanding of the rural dynamic, but also for our understanding of the wider trajectory of democratization in Nigeria.

4. Conclusion: Promise & Limits of the Historical Approach:

I have argued that the mobilization and exercise of political authority in contemporary rural Kano cannot be understood by sole reliance on the quantitative and culturalist approaches.

While both can enhance our understanding of significant aspects of the rural political process, their exaggerated methodological claims are without foundation.

The quantitative approach deals with 'generated evidence', but the capacity for this is limited in Africa.

Culturalist approaches, on the other hand, seek 'interpretative evidence' from which to generalize and theorize about social behaviour and societal dynamics.

While this hermeneutic tradition makes possible the interpretation of meaning, it is also open to idiosyncratic misapplication and cultural essentialism.

The historical approach is based on 'found evidence' which abound in Africa and it can be fruitfully harnessed to the other two methodologies.

Unlike socio-anthropologists who are concerned with generalizations, historians particularize through the description of unique cases.

The historical approach is therefore capable of generating narratives which, as Goldthorpe argues, can improve our understanding of statistical evidence.

Statistical inferences can be fruitfully subjected to the 'test of history' and discrepancies between statistical and historical explanations force us to sharpen our research questions.

Furthermore, the 'forensic skills' of the historian and the 'analytical skills' of the socio-anthropologist can also be fruitfully combined.

History might therefore be a useful connecting bridge between the statistical and socio-anthropological approaches.

But the historical approach is not necessarily a panacea.

How we used it is just as important; history, like 'data' is after all, another construct

:

We need to be comprehensive in approach, rather than being narrowly selective of those aspects of history that support our preconceptions;

We also need to exercise judgment and sensitivity with respect to the reality we are trying to understand.

King, Gary, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, 2000, 'Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol., 44, No. 2, April, pp. 347-341, p.355.

Safire, William, 'The Bradley Effect', *New York Times*, Sept. 26, 2008,
HYPERLINK "<http://www.nytimes.com>"
www.nytimes.com

. The Bradley Effect is 'the phenomenon of black candidates to register significantly better in public-opinion polls than on Election Day', while the Bradley-Effect Effect is the supposition that 'working class voters will react to the racism charge by going out of their way to prove it false'.

Mannes, Aaron, 2008, 'Testing The Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leader Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?', *The Journal of International Policy Solutions*, Vol. 9, Spring.

Heath Anthony, Stephen Fisher, and Shawna Smith, 2005, 'The Globalization of Public Opinion Research', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8.

Lindberg, Staffan. 2006. *Democracy and Elections in Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

An example of this would be the Afrobarometer data for various African countries.

Cf. Williams, Gavin., Brian Williams & Roy Williams, 1998, 'Sociology and Historical Explanation', *African Sociological Review*, 1, 2.

Whitehead, Laurence, forthcoming, 'Foreword' to Mustapha & Whitfield, eds., *Africa Since Democratisation*, James Currey, Oxford.

cf. Blair, W. Harry, 1975, 'Primary and secondary characteristics in peasant politics at the micro-level in an Indian constituency: a statistical odyssey', *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 9, 55.

Lewis, M. Peter and Bratton, Michael, 2000, 'Attitude to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria', *Afrobarometer Paper No. 3*, April.

Kuenzi, Michelle and Lambright, Gina, 2005, 'Who Votes in Africa? An Examination of Electoral Turnout in 10 African Countries', *Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 51*, August.

Dray, James, 2007, 'Abstention in elections in the Durban Metropolitan area: causes and effects on the political process', M.Phil Thesis, Department of Politics & IR, University of Oxford.

Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 2006. *Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning*. London: Hurst & Company.

For an extended critique see Meagher, Kate. 2006, 'Cultural Primordialism and the Post Structuralist Imaginaire: Plus ca Change ...'. *Africa* 76(4): 590-97 and Mustapha, AR. 2006. 'Rethinking Africanist Political Science', in *The Study of Africa: Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Encounters*, ed. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza. Vol.1, CODESRIA, Dakar.

Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2004, 'Sharia and Control over Territory: Conflicts Between "Settlers" and "Indigenes" in Nigeria', *African Affairs*, 103/412, p. 431. Also see Freedom House, 2002, *The Talibanization of Nigeria: Sharia Law and Religious Freedom*, Center for Religious Freedom; and McCormack, David, 2005, 'An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Occasional Papers Series No. 4*, The Center for Security Policy, Washington, DC.

Erdmann G. and U. Engel, 2007, 'Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 45, 1.

Cf. Crook, Richard. 1989. 'Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Cote D'Ivoire', *African Affairs* 88.

Mustapha, AR, *Paradox of Democratization: Peasants, Politics, and Islamic Radicalism in rural Nigeria*, (Manuscript under preparation).

Smith, M G, 1964, 'Historical and Cultural Conditions of Corruption Among the Hausa', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 6, No. 2.

cf. Hill, Polly, 1968, 'The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry: A Northern Nigeria Case Study', The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol., 10, No.2; and 1972, Rural Hausa: a village and a setting, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

cf. Loimeier, Roman, 2005, 'Playing with Affiliations: Muslims in Northern Nigeria in the 20th Century', in Fourchard, Laurent, Andre Mary and Rene Otayek, eds., Entreprises religieuses transnationales en Afrique de l'Ouest, IFRA-Karthala, Ibadan & Paris.

Ake, Claude, 1995, 'The Democratisation of Disempowerment', in Hippler, Jochen, ed., The Democratisation of Disempowerment - The Problem of Democracy in the Third World, Pluto Press, London.

Mustapha, A.R. and Jones, EL., 2005, 'Change, Chieftaincy and Conflict in Three West African Communities', in Vaughan, O., ed., Tradition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Africa, Africa World Press, Trenton.

cited in Williams et al, op cit.

Compare, for example, the completely opposite interpretations of the institutional history of the Nigerian state in Bach, DC, 2004, 'Nigeria: Towards a Country Without a State', Conference on Nigeria, Overseas Development Institute, London, June and Suberu, R, forthcoming, 'Federalism and the Management of Conflict over Sharia in Nigeria', Journal of International Development.

PAGE

PAGE

reWeF;

}E}E}m} `}m}E}OD

ti□i[i[Oi

{qkqk {qkq`qk{Y

www.nytimes.com

www.nytimes.com

<http://www.nytimes.com/>

<http://www.nytimes.com/>

Normal

Normal

Heading 1

Heading 1

Default Paragraph Font

Default Paragraph Font

Table Normal

Table Normal

No List

No List

Table Grid

Table Grid

Body Text

Body Text
Body Text Indent
Body Text Indent
Body Text 2
Body Text 2
Table Heading
Table Heading
Italics
Italics
Sub-heading
Sub-heading
Comment Reference
Comment Reference
Footnote Italics
Footnote Italics
Footnote Reference
Footnote Reference
Footnote Text
Footnote Text
Indented Quotation
Indented Quotation
Header
Header
Page Number
Page Number
Hyperlink
Hyperlink
Endnote Text
Endnote Text
Endnote Reference
Endnote Reference
HTML Preformatted
HTML Preformatted
story-body
story-body
*Eurn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
*Eurn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
City0€http://www.5iamas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags_
*Eurn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
country-region
http://www.5iantlavalamp.com/V
*Eurn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
http://www.5iantlavalamp.com/8
*Eurn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3

Unknownŷ !

Times New Roman

Times New Roman

Symbol

Symbol

CG Times (W1)

CG Times (W1)

Times New Roman

Times New Roman

Courier

Courier

Courier New

Courier New

Bookman

Bookman

Bookman Old Style

Bookman Old Style

Letter Gothic

Letter Gothic

Courier New

Courier New

Courier New

Courier New

Wingdings

Wingdings

Thomas Hodgkin Lecture

Thomas Hodgkin Lecture

Thomas Hodgkin Lecture

Normal

Microsoft Word 10.0

Thomas Hodgkin Lecture

_PID_HLINKS

<http://www.nytimes.com/>

<http://www.nytimes.com/>

Root Entry

1Table

1Table

WordDocument

WordDocument
SummaryInformation
SummaryInformation
DocumentSummaryInformation
DocumentSummaryInformation
CompObj
CompObj
Microsoft Word Document
MSWordDoc
Word.Document.8